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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been increasing public concern over the right of insurers
to arbitrarily cancel existing automobile insurance policies and the
refusal to renew expired policies. The insurance industry has met this
criticism by voluntarily limiting their rights to cancel or refuse to
renew, and by proposing and supporting state legislation to regulate
cancellation and non-renewal. This public concern has been voiced in
the chambers of the United States Congress, and there is a present
danger that the Federal government may encroach upon the traditional
and time honored system of the state regulation of the insurance indus-
try.
1
Some of the public criticism may be justified with regard to the few
insurance companies who have arbitrarily canceled or refused to renew
the policies of their policyholders.2 However, recent studies have shown
that the large majority of the companies within the insurance industry
do not follow such practices and that the number of cancellations and
refusals to renew is insignificant in relation to the total number of
policies outstanding.3
This article will discuss the more recently enacted and proposed
state legislation aimed at the problems of cancellation and non-renewal.
These legislative proposals would not only drastically modify the in-
surer's right to cancel or refuse to renew, but could also prevent the
insurer from invoking its traditional common law right to rescind
the policy for misrepresentation. This article will also discuss many of
the more recent cases dealing with cancellation, non-renewal, and res-
cission of the automobile insurance policy.4
II. RECENT STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UPON THE RIGHT
OF CANCELLATION OR NON-RENEWAL
At least twenty-four states have enacted laws regulating the can-
cellation or non-renewal of automobile insurance policies ;5 thirteen of
1 A recent Congressional report stated that Members of Congress have received
complaints of "oftentimes arbitrary and capricious cancellation or refusal to
renew automobile insurance policies. . . ." HousE CoIM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, AUTHORIZING A STUDY OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT
COMPENSATION SYSTEM, H.R. REP. No. 1282, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (The resolu-
tion passed and was signed by President Johnson on May 22, 1968).
2 Paul Wise, general manager of AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
states in the April 19, 1968 issue of The National Underwriter, "There is a
growing evidence that public complaints about unfair or arbitrary cancellation
are being triggered by the activities of companies representing a relatively
small share of the total business."
3 Id. A 1966 Wisconsin survey showed that the state's auto insurers as a group
canceled only .57% of the policies in force during the midterm and declined
to renew only 2.06%
4 For a short outline of this article, see, Ghiardi, Cancellation, Expiration and
Rescission of Automobile Insurance Policies, P.L.I.-AuToIOBILE INSURANCE
PROBLEMfS, Ch. 5, 117-143 (1968).3 See Appendix.
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these states have enacted new or revised statutes within the last year. 6
These statutes may prescribe:
(a) requirements as to advance notice to the insured of a cancella-
tion or refusal to renew;
(b) requirements as to the content of the notice;
(c) limitations upon the reason for cancellation or non-renewal;
(d) limitations upon the method of cancellation or non-renewal.
The major trade associations of the insurance industry have taken
a leading role in the reform of state laws regulating the cancellation
and non-renewal of automobile insurance policies. The American Insu-
rance Association, the American Mutual Insurance Association, and the
National Association of Independent Insurers, have been working closely
in the development and support of model cancellation legislation. Early
in 1967, the three associations developed four "model bills" which had
many common characteristics but which varied in their content in order
to meet the demands of a particular jurisdiction. Some states have
already enacted statutes substantially similar to these proposals.
The most recent proposal, which has received the approval of AIA
and AMIA, would limit cancellation by insurers to only two reasons-
nonpayment of premium and the loss of driving privileges. NAIl has
not fully accepted this most recent proposal because they believe that
the two reason-approach may create other practical problems.7 Through-
out this article the various trade association proposals will be referred
to collectively as the "model bill." Generally, the term "model bill"
refers to the most extensive proposal advanced, which was that proposed
by AIA in November of 1967.
The effect of these statutes on existing law can only be surmised
until case law develops. Limitations upon the method of cancellations
will not be discussed because only a few of the statutes modify the
method of cancellation as prescribed in the standard automobile insu-
rance policy. Thus a few statutes require that the notice be sent by
registered or certified mail," instead of regular mail which is sufficient
under the standard policy.?
A. Requirements of Advance Notice
Nineteen states have statutory provisions that require the insurer
to mail to the insured advance notice of the effective date of cancella-
6 Ibid.
7 Letter from Steven S. Skarlet, Ass't Counsel NAII, to the authors, March 5,
1968.
8 M.ASs. GEN. LAWs. ANN. ch. 175, § 113, A (2) (Supp. 1966) (registered .mail);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.1302 (Supp. 1968) (certified mail).
9 See Section IV.
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tion,1O and seventeen require advance notice of non-renewal." These
statutes require that the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal
be at least ten to forty-five days from the date of the mailing of the
notice. 12 These statutes may apply to all automobile insurance policies,
or only to policies issued under the state's financial responsibility law.
If the statute only applies to policies issued under the financial respon-
sibility laws, problems involving construction of the statute may arise.
This problem arose in the case of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Gosnell.13 The
Maryland statute required that thirty days advance notice of cancella-
tion be given to the applicable state agency regulating the financial re-
sponsibility law and was silent as to whether such notice was required
to be given the insured in order to effectively cancel the policy.' 4 The
insurer mailed advance notice of cancellation to the state agency which
was to be effective thirty days from the mailing, and mailed a similar
notice to the insured, which was to be effective twenty days from the
mailing. The accident in question occurred subsequent to the twenty
day period but prior to the thirty day period. The insured conceded that
it was obligated to pay for the damages of innocent third parties injured
in the accident since the period for cancellation under the financial
10 See Appendix. The case of Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1968
CCH Auto. Ins. Cases 7787 (Cal. App. 1968) construed this type of statute as
also eliminating the right of rescission for a material misrepresentation. This
case is further discussed at note 158 infra.
11 Ibid.
12 CAL. INS. CODE § 651 (Supp. 1967) (ten days-cancellation); W. VA. CODE
§ 33-6A-4 (Supp. 1967) (forty-five days-nonrenewal).
13246 Md. 724, 230 A2d 467 (1967).
14 The following statutes only require advance notice to the applicable state
agency and a problem similar to the Erie case could arise. ALA. CODE tit. 36,
§ 74(63) (Supp. 1965) ; ALAS. STAT. § 28.20.450 (1959) ; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 28-1171 (Supp. 1967) ; ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-1467 (Supp. 1967); CAL.
INS. CODE § 16433 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-39 (1967);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 14-112(b) (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,§ 2908 (Supp. 1967) ; D.C. CODE § 40-474 (Supp. 1966) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS§ 160-111 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.181 (Supp. 1967); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-1522 (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1064 (1967); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 95/, § 7-318 (Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-726 (b)
(Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT. § 187.500 (Supp. 1967) ; LA. REv. STAT. § 32:901
(Supp. 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 29, § 787 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN.
CODE ART. 66 , § 142 (1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113A (Supp.
1966) ; MICH. Com. LAWS ANN. § 257.521 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. § 170.41
(Supp. 1967); MIss. CODE ANN. § 8285.22 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 303.210 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 530439 (Supp. 1967) ; NEB.
REv. STAT. § 60-544 (Supp. 1967); NEv. REv. STAT. § 485.3092 (1967); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 39:6-40 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-88 (Supp. 1967) ;
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 313 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309
(Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16-21 (Supp. 1967) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4509.57 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-325 (Supp. 1967) ; ORE.
REV. STAT.§ 486-506 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1422 (1967) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 31-32-25 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE § 46-702 (Supp. 1967) ; S.D.
CODE § 44.03A52 (1960) ;TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1224 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. Art. 6701h, § 22 (Supp. 1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §41-12-22 (Supp.
1967) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 804 (Supp. 1967) ; Ch. 623 [1966] VA. Session
Laws 957; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.29.500 (Supp. 1967); W. VA. § 17D-
4-13 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 344.34 (Supp. 1967); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-312 (Supp. 1967).
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responsibility law had not expired. The insurer paid these claims and
subsequently brought suit against its insured for reimbursement under
the financial responsibility clause of its policy.1 5 The insurer argued that
the twenty day notice of cancellation was valid as to its insured, who
should thus be required to reimburse the insurer for the claims paid.
The court rejected the insurer's contention and stated: ". .. the require-
ment of the Act, as we interpret it, makes the 30 day notice a requisite
for an effective cancellation as between the parties to the policy as well
as to the public.... ,,16
Problems may also arise as to the construction of statutes which
require advance notice of non-renewal. One such problem is whether
a notice of'non-renewal is required when the insured rejects an offer
of renewal or remains silent. Another problem is whether a notice of
non-renewal may be effective if it is found in the regular renewal
premium notice which includes an admonition to the insured that if
the premium is not forth-coming within a certain period of time the
policy will expire on a certain date. The case law is not entirely clear
on these questions, and most of the cases have been limited to the state
of New York. These problems are discussed in a fairly current article
in The Insurance Counsel Journal by Walter Relihan.17
B. Requirements as to the Content of the Notice
Several of the more recently enacted or proposed state statutes re-
quire that the insurer include certain information for the benefit of the
insured in its notice of cancellation or non-renewal. Some statutes re-
quire that the insurer include specific reasons for its cancellation or
non-renewal, or that the notice of cancellation or non-renewal include
a statement to the effect that upon written request of the named insured,
the insurer will specify the reasons for such cancellation or non-
renewal' Some statutes require the insurer in its notice of cancellation
or non-renewal to inform the insured of his possible eligibility for in-
surance through the assigned risk plan of the state;"9 or, if the state
has a compulsory auto insurance law, to inform the insured of his
obligation under such law.2°
It seems that the purpose of requiring the insurer to include in a
notice of cancellation or non-renewal the reasons thereof, is to serve as
a check upon arbitrary cancellation and to insure that the policyholder
fully understands the reason for cancellation or non-renewal. This pro-
15 See note 145 infra.
16 See note 13 supra 230 A.2d at 472.
17 Relihan, The Uncertain Expiration Date of the Auto Liability Policy: Some
Problems Under Financial Security and Compulsory Insurance Law, 29 INs.
COUNSEL J. 639 (1962).
18 Wis. STAT. 204.341 (8) (1967) (cancellation and nonrenewal) ; N.Y. Assembly
Bill No. 5403 (Feb. 1968) (cancellation and nonrenewal).
'9 Wis. STAT. 204.341 (7) (1967).
20 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 313 (Supp. 1967).
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vision would also allow the insured to correct a cancellation or non-
renewal which is based upon mistaken information. The "model bill"
would only require that the reasons be furnished in a notice of cancella-
tion, and not in a notice of non-renewal. However, a Wisconsin statute 2 1
and a bill before the New York legislature which is supported by the
New York Insurance Department, would also require that the reasons
be included in a notice of non-renewal.22 The New York bill would
require that the reasons be included in the notice, whereas the "model
bill" provides in the alternative that the insurer may include a statement
that the reasons will be furnished upon the request of the insured.
Assuming that the reason given for the cancellation or non-renewal
is proven to be "incorrect," the question arises as to whether the can-
cellation is effective notwithstanding the defective reason, and whether
the insurer may be liable for defamation for supplying an incorrect
reason in its notice though the statutes generally protect the insurer
from liability for defamation. The "model bill" provides immunity from
defamation for the insurer and other persons who furnish information
as to the reasons for cancellation.3 The New York bill 4 would provide
for immunity only if the statement of the reason was in "good faith."
Although the insurer may not be liable for defamation in supplying
an incorrect reason for cancellation, the question may arise as to whether
the cancellation for an incorrect reason is effective to terminate the
policy. The case of Sawyer v. State Farm Fire & Gas Co. 25 held that
cancellation is ineffective if it is for an "incorrect" reason. The insurer's
policy stated that it was issued "in consideration of the premium paid."
The court held that the statement in the policy constituted an acknowl-
edgement of the receipt of the premium, and that under a California
statute this constituted conclusive evidence of the payment of the
premium. Despite the fact that the total premium had not been paid,
the insurer could not cancel the policy for nonpayment of premium.
"Where a notice of cancellation specifies as the sole reason for the can-
cellation of an automobile insurance policy grounds not legally available
to the insurer, the notice is not effective." 26
Assuming that the reason provided is correct, how specific must the
insurer's statement of the reason be? A recent case arose under the
Massachusetts statute which requires the insurer to give "specific reason
or reasons for such cancellation." 27 Fields v. Parsons28 held that the
insurer's notice of cancellation which gave as the reason for cancella-
21 Wis. STAT. § 204.341 (8) (1967).
22 Ibid.
22 AIA, Cancellation-Nonreneval Bill (Nov. 30, 1967) Section 8.
24 See note 18 supra.
2562 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. App. 1967).
2GId. at 713.
27 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 175, § 113 A (2) (Supp. 1966).
28 1968 CCH Auto. Ins. Cases 7524 (Mass. App. 1968).
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tion-"Misstatements in application to Question 8A"-was not specific
enough to effectuate cancellation under the Massachusetts statute.
It does not inform the insurer of the substance of question 8A,
of the nature of the "misstatements" discovered, or, indeed,
whether the questions was included in the application for regis-
tration or for insurance. Had an adequate notice been given to
(the insured), he may have found grounds to prevent the can-
cellation, or have been able to obtain a new policy of insurance
elsewhere. Compliance with the notice requirement is important
to the effective administration of the compulsory motor vehicle
insurance law since the legislative purpose was to make the
validity of the registration coterminous with the maintenance
of the minimum security .... Compliance also serves as a safe-
guard against unintentional or mistaken action to the detriment
of the traveling public and to the insured. .... 29
This seems to place too great a burden upon the insurer, and it is hoped
that other jurisdictions would either not follow this case or distinguish
it. It should be emphasized that the case arose under the compulsory
automobile insurance law of Massachusetts. It should also be pointed
out that the Massachusetts' statute requires the "specific" reason or
reasons for cancellation, whereas other statutes as the "model bill" do
not use the word "specific."3 0 Although there have been no recent cases
as to the effect of a notice of cancellation which fails to contain infor-
mation informing an insured of his possible eligibility under the as-
signed risk plan of the state, it has been held in the New York case of
Mong v. Allstate Ins. Co.31 that a notice of cancellation which fails to
include a warning to the insured of his obligations under the compulsory
auto insurance law is ineffective to cancel the policy.
C. Limitation Upon Reasons for Cancellation
or Refusal to Renew
Most of the recent statutes have restricted the reasons for which an
insured can cancel. Seventeen state statutes provide that the insurer can
cancel only on certain legislatively approved grounds. 32 This is illus-
trated by the recently enacted Illinois statute3 3 which provides that after
the insurer has a sixty day underwriting period in which to investigate
the risk, the company can cancel for certain specified reasons. These
reasons include: nonpayment of premium; material misrepresentations;
violations of the terms or conditions of the policy; failure to disclose
accidents or violations; failure to disclose necessary information to the
insurer; aiding fraudulent claims; convictions of certain traffic viola-
tions; an accident record, conviction record (criminal or traffic), physi-
29 Id. at 7525.
30 AIA, Cancellation-Nonrenewal Bill (Nov. 30, 1967) Section 3.
31 15 A.D.2d 257, 223 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1962).32 See Appendix.
33 ILL. STAT. ANN. 73-755.3 (Supp. 1967).
1967-681
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cal, mental or other condition which is such that his operation of an
automobile may endanger public safety; or certain changes in the condi-
tion or use of the insured behicle. The Illinois statute provides for a
hearing with the Director or Insurance, in which the insured my con-
test the reasons for cancellation.- The Illinois statute is very similar
to the "model bills" which have been endorsed by AIA, AMIA and
NAIL.
Wisconsin has recently enacted a statute which prohibits the insurer
from basing his cancellation or refusal to renew upon certain prohibited
grounds. 35 The Wisconsin statute is unique in that it is "prohibitive,"
rather than "prescriptive." In Illinois the insurer can cancel for only
certain legislatively sanctioned reasons, whereas in Wisconsin the in-
surer can cancel for any reason whatsoever as long as he does not base
his cancellation solely upon certain legislatively prohibited grounds.
Thus the Wisconsin provision is to some extent less restrictive than
any of the "model bills." However, the Wisconsin statute is more
restrictive in its scope, because it applies not only to cancellation but
also to non-renewal. None of the "model bills" attempt to restrict the
insurer's right to refuse to renew. Many of the prohibited grounds in
the Wisconsin statute do not really restrict the action of the insurer, in
that they merely prevent religious or racial discrimination or similar
activitiesaG However, several parts of the statute are significant in that
they prohibit cancellation or refusal to renew solely on the basis of age,
residence, or occupation.
AMIA and AIA have indicated that they will sponsor and actively
promote legislation to limit cancellation (not refusal to renew) to only
the nonpayment of premium, and the revocation or suspension of license
or registration, after the sixty day underwriting period. The AIA pro-
posal would apply not only to the liability coverage, but also to medical
payments, uninsured motorist, automobile physical damage and auto-
mobile collision coverage. The AMIA-AIA proposal would not provide
an appeal to the insurance commissioner, as the Illinois statute does,
since its sponsors feel that with grounds for cancellation so limited the
probability of appeals is quite remote.37 This most recent AIA-AMIA
"model bill" has already been enacted in South Dakota.38
Although the most recent AIA-AMIA "model bill" purports only
to restrict the insurer's right of "cancellation," serious questions exist
34 ILL. STAT. ANN. 73-755.10 (Supp. 1967).
35 WIS. STAT. 204.341 (4) (1967) provides: No insurer shall cancel or refuse to
renew an automobile liability insurance policy solely because of the age, resi-
dence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry or occupation of anyone
who is an insured.
36 Other state statutes merely prohibiting discrimination in the sale or cancella-
tion of insurance policies are; CAL. INS. CODE § 11628 (Supp. 1967), and N.Y.
INS. LAW § 40(10) (Supp. 1967).
37 Le'ter from Rafael Alexander, of AIA, to the authors Dec. 20, 1967.
38S. D., H-684, Laws 1968.
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as to whether the bill would eliminate the insurer's common law right
of rescission. This is reinforced by the fact that the previous "model
bills" had recognized misrepresentation as one of the sanctioned reasons
for cancellation. Limitations upon the insurer's right of rescission have
been recognized in both the case law and statutory law, as will be dis-
cussed infra, and such limitation would appear to be justified after the
occurence of loss. For example, when innocent third parties are involved,
the policy may be held enforceable despite the fraud of the insured in
order to protect the interests of the innocent third parties. However,
there seems to be little justification for preventing the insurer from
canceling the insurance for misrepresentation prior to the occurrence
of loss. For example, is there any good reason why an insurer should be
prevented from canceling an insurance policy when, subsequent to the
initial sixty day underwriting period, it discovers that the insured has
perpetrated a fraud upon it?
Aside from the Wisconsin statute, none of the statutes or proposals
would restrict the reason for which an insurer could refuse to renew an
insurance policy. Although critics of the insurance industry could argue
that the recent "model bills" are mere "tokenism" since they merely limit
cancellation and insurers could still arbitrarily refuse to renew policies.
This argument does not recognize the other solutions available for the
problems of non-renewal. For example, assuming that the refusal to
renew was arbitrary, the insured would stand a good chance of obtain-
ing insurance with another company, because there has been increasing
activity in the industry to ignore prior cancellation as a determinative
factor in underwriting. If the refusal to renew was justified, the critics
of the industry fail to recognize the availability of assigned risk plans
which exist in every state in the United States.39
Because the most recent AMIA-AIA proposal has been enacted in
only one state (and this enactment was quite recent), 0 there have been
no cases interpreting it and one can only speculate as to the prospective
judicial interpretation. However, recent cases point out a trend toward
finding an improper cancellation, and these cases may be helpful in
predicting the future development of the law.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently had the opportunity
to define "nonpayment of premium" under its assigned risk laws. Har-
relson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Inc. Co. held the insured's failure to
pay the insurer a filing fee under the financial responsibility law did not
constitute a nonpayment of premium within the meaning of the assigned
risk statute authorizing cancellation for the nonpayment of premium.
3oSee notes 156 and 157 infra.4oSee note 38 supra.
4' 158 S.E.2d 812 (N.C. 1968).
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The court stated:
So as to accomplish the purpose of the Legislature we hold that
this charge, while lawfully and rightfully due the defendant
(insurer), was not a premium, on the policy but was a charge
for the issuance by the defendant of a separate and distinct
document whereby it incurred a different obligation .... 42
Thus, the fact that the insured owes the insurer a debt does not neces-
sarily mean that the failure to discharge this obligation constitutes a
failure to pay the premium.
A Tennessee appellate court, in the case of State Farm Mut. Auto.
Inc. Co. v. Darnel4 3 held that a cancellation for nonpayment of premiums
was not effective when the agent of the insurer had sufficient funds of
insured in his possession to pay the premium.
D. The Scope of the Cancellation-Nonrenewal
Statutes and Proposals
Originally, the so-called "model bills" applied only to automobile
liability insurance, medical payments, and uninsured motorist coverage.
Later the three trade associations agreed to also include physical damage
insurance.44 Generally the statutes or proposals do not apply to:
(a) assigned risk policies
(b) fleet policies
(c) garage-owned automobiles 5
The reason behind the last two exclusions seems to be a judgment that
the purchasers of such policies are sufficiently knowledgeable about in-
surance coverage, with a sufficient coverage, with a sufficient bargaining
position and hence are not in need of the statutory protection. Assigned
risk policies are excluded probably because of a belief that the insureds
under the assigned risk plan are already sufficiently protected from ar-
bitrary cancellation under the terms of the plan. Whether or not this
assumption is valid depends upon the terms and conditions of the as-
signed risk plan in the jurisdiction in which the cancellation-nonrenewal
legislation is enacted. Because of this exclusion, the situation could
arise wherein the insurer would be restricted in its cancellation or non-
renewal of its regular policies under the statute, yet because of the
statutory exclusion be unrestricted in its cancellation or nonrenewal of
assigned risks policies.
42 ID. at 819.
43 1968 CCH Auto. Ins. Cases 7600 (Tenn. App. 1968).
44See note 7 supra.
45 AIA-Cancellation-Nonrenewal Bill (Nov. 30, 1967) in Section 1 (A) provides:
this Act shall not apply (1) to any policy issued under an automobile assigned
risk plan, or (2) to any policy insuring more than four automobiles, or (3) to
any policy covering garage, automobile sales agency, repair shop, service sta-
tion or public parking place operation hazards.
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A study of the Wisconsin Automobile Assigned Risk Plan46 shows
that the plan provides for many of the problems which the cancellation-
nonrenewal "model bills" attempt to deal with. The applicant for the
assigned risk plan must certify that he attempted and was unable to
obtain insurance in the state within sixty days prior to his application.
The application must be made in "good faith," which means that the
applicant "reports all information of a material nature, and does not
wilfully make incorrect or misleading statements." '4 The major eligibility
requirement for admission and continuance in the plan is that the ap-
plicant has not been convicted within the previous thirty-six months of
two major or six minor traffic violations.:" The applicant may also be
ineligible if he is subject to certain physical or mental disabilities.49
Under the plan all eligible applicants are provided coverage for the
period of four years. The insurer is required to issue three renewal
policies; 45 days prior to the expiration date of the annual term of the
policy, the insurer is required to notify the insured that it will issue a
renewal and of the premium payable, or that the insured is not entitled
to insurance under the plan. Forty-five days prior to the expiration date
of the third renewal policy, the insurer must notify the insured that
the assignment under the plan will terminate upon the expiration date
of the policy.50 At the end of the four year period, if the insured is
still unable to obtain regular insurance, he must make a new application
for the plan.-1 The insurer is given the right to cancel the coverage
pursuant to notice provisions of the policy issued.52 The plan requires
that the policy be issued in accordance with the terms of the Standard
Provisions Basic Automobile Liability Policy (1955 Edition) ,3 which
requires 10 days advance notice of cancellation by the insurer.5 4 The
insurer is also required to give 10 days advance notice to the Commis-
sioner of Insurance of all cancellations, other than those for the non-
payment of premium.
5 5
Under the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan the insurer is limited as
to the reason for which it may cancel the policy. 8 One of the authorized
46Wisconsin Automobile Assigned Risk Plan, distributed by Nat. Bur. of Cas.
Underwriters, N.Y. (adopted pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 204.51 (2) (1967).
47Id. § 9.
481d. § 9 (A) through (F).
49d § 9 (G).
50 1d. § 14 (B) and (C).
5.Id. § 13.
52 Id. § 18.
1d. § 16 A.
54The cancellation clause of the Standard Provisions Basic Automobile Policy
(1955 Ed.) is substantially similar to the provisions of the Standard Family
Combination Automobile Policy (1963 Rev.) which may be found in Section
IV infra.
5 Wisconsin Automobile Assigned Risk Plan, note 46 supra § 18.3A'eq I1eqs u[Cj s~ql japun iapu!q .o o iod e panssi suq pqm iapmIo V
: salls (ED 81 § 'PI 9
1967-68]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
reasons is that the insured "has obtained the insurance through fraud or
misrepresentation." The insurer or an applicant may appeal any can-
cellation or denial of insurance to the Governing Committee of the
Plan, and hence to the Commissioner of Insurance. 5 7 Although an in-
surer under the Assigned Risk Plan may use misrepresentation as a
reason for cancellation, a question could arise as to whether he can
rescind the policy ab initio for a material misrepresentation. However,
the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan is clear and states: "Nothing herein
shall be deemed to affect the carrier's right to rescind a policy for fraud
or misrepresentation or to invoke other remedies provided by law."58s
The requirement of advance notice of cancellation and nonrenewal
of the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan is quite similar to the provisions
of the more recently enacted or proposed legislation found in the "model
bills," although hte Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan's ten day advance
notice of cancellation is perhaps a shorter period of time than that
found in the recent proposals or statutes. The "model bill" requires
that the insurer include in the notice of cancellation a statement of the
reason for cancellation or a statement that the reasons may be obtained
upon request, whereas the Assigned Risk Plan does not have this re-
quirement.
Under the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan, the insurer may cancel
or rescind a policy for misrepresentation whereas under the AIA-AMIA
"model bill," the insurer would not be able to cancel the policy for
misrepresentation, and could probably be denied the right of rescission.
Thus, the enactment of a statute similar to the most recent AIA-AMIA
proposal may create a paradoxical situation in that the insurer could
not rescind or cancel most of their regular automobile insurance policies
on account of misrepresentation, but could rescind or cancel assigned
risk policies for misrepresentation.
Under the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan the insurer may cancel
an insured's policy if the insured accumulates a record of traffic viola-
tions which would make him ineligible under the plan. However, under
the most recent AIA-AMIA proposal, except for non-payment of pre-
mium, the insurer can only cancel the policy when the insured or certain
other persons have their driver's license or motor vehicle registration
the right to cancel the insurance by giving notice as required in the policy
or binder if the insured
1. is not or ceases to be eligible or in good faith entitled to insurance, or
2. has failed to comply with reasonable safety requirement, or
3. has violated any of the terms or conditions upon the basis of which the
insurance was issued, or
4. has obtained the insurance through fraud or misrepresentation, or
5. has failed to pay any premiums due under the policy. . ..
W Id. § 19.
58 Id. § 18.
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revoked. 59 These "other persons" include any person who either resides
in the same household of the insured, or who customarily operates the
insured's automobile. Thus, the AIA-AMIA proposal would rely to an
even greater extent upon the licensing and registration requirements of
the jurisdiction in question than does the Wisconsin Assigned Risk Plan.
If the right of cancellation is to be controlled by the state statutes regu-
lating licensing and registration, the insurance industry has even more
reason to support the adoption of stricter licensing and registration re-
quirements.
III. RECENT VOLUNTARY LIMITATIONS UPON THE RIGHT OF
CANCELLATION OR NONRENEWAL
Many insurance companies have agreed to voluntarily limit their
right of cancellation or nonrenewal. These proposals may be either in
the form of company directives or by endorsement in the insurance
policy. Some insurance organizations have recently supported legislative
action instead of such voluntary action because of the failure of a few
companies to adopt the voluntary proposals.60
The earliest of these proposals was the voluntary restriction upon
the reasons for which an insurer could base its cancellation. The number
of these reasons varied anywhere from seven to the more recent pro-
posal of two; namely, the nonpayment of premium and the loss of
driving privileges.61 The voluntary restriction is not effective until after
a sixty day underwriting period, during which the insurer may investi-
gate the risk and the statements in the application. An example of this
type of limitation is the "Pledge Against Cancellation" endorsement of
Allstate Insurance Co. 62 Allstate's "Pledge Against Cancellation" does
9 AIA, Cancellation-Nonrenewal Bill (Nov. 30, 1967) Section 2 (A) provides:(A) A notice of cancellation of a policy shall be effective only if it is
based on one or more of the following reasons:(a) nonpayment of premium; or(b) the driver's license or mortor vehicle registration of the named
insured or of any other operator who either resides in the same
household or customarily operates an automobile insured under
the policy has been under suspension or revocation during the
policy period or, if the policy is a renewal, during its policy
period or the 180 days immediately preceding its effective date.60 AIIA, News Release, (Feb. 15, 1968).
G1 Insurance Information Institute, News Release, (Nov. 29, 1967). For the in-
terpretation of comparable provisions in accident and health policies, see Annot.,
Construction of Express Insurance Policy Provision Restricting Insurer's Right
to Cancel or Otherwise Terminate Coverage, 19 A.L.R.3d 1429 (1968).
62 The endorsement provides:
ALLSTATE PLEDGES
effective 60 days after the inception of such coverages, or effective immedi-
ately if Allstate has renewed such coverages, that thereafter during the
five year period following the effective date of this endorsement:
1. Allstate shall not exercise its right to cancel such coverages or reduce
the limits the liability of such coverages, and2. Allstate shall continue such coverages in force, all subject to the follow-
ing conditions:
A. Allstate's obligation to continue the coverages in force during such
period shall be met by the annual or semi-annual extension of the
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not apply to certain misrepresentations, because the Pledge is made
expressly subject to tre truth of the declarations in the policy.6 3 Taylor
v. BlackG4 held that Allstate's "Pledge Against Cancellation" did not
bar avoidance ab initio of the policy for a material misrepresentation.
The court stated:
[B y reason of Black's (the insured) fraudulent representations
the policy was void ab initio, there never was an effective con-
tract, with the result that neither the Pledge nor any of the
other policy provisions are binding on the garnishee (insurer).
65
More recently various insurance companies have agreed to voluntarily
restrict the reason for wrich they could refuse to renew automobile
insurance policies. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. and Allstate In-
surance Co. have recently issued "guarantees of renewal."66 The re-
Automobile Bodily Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability
coverages until they have thus been kept in force for the five year
period. Each such extension shall be in accordance with the policy
forms and at the rates legally in effect for use by Allstate at the
time of such annual or semi-annual extension.
B. This agreement shall be void and of no effect:(1) If, during such five year period, the named insured or any
resident of the named insured's household is convicted or for-
feits bail for any of the following:
(a) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor or narcotic drugs;
(b) failing to stop and report when involved in an accident;
(c) homicide arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle;
(d) driving a motor vehicle during a period of revocation or
suspension of his driver's license;
(e) theft of a motor vehicle;
(f) the making of false statements in the application for driver's
license.
(2) If the insured fails to comply with policy Condition 8, which
requires assistance and cooperation after an accident, or ceases
to be domiciled in a state wherein Allstate regularly affords the
protection afforded by this endorsement.
(3) If the named insured's representations, as contained in policy
Declaration 10, are not true.
(4) If the premium for the policy, or for any annual or semi-annual
extension thereof, is not paid when due.
(5) As regards insurance afforded with respect to any "owned auto-
mobile" which is not a "private passenger automobile."
63 Id. under 2 (B) (3) of the endorsement.
64 258 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Mo. E.D. 1966) ; The fact that the "Pledge" is subject
to the truth of the declarations in the policy was not determinative of the
Taylor case, because Allstate failed to plead misrepresentation in the declara-
tions, but only pleaded that the application for the policy contained misrepre-
sentations.
65 Id. at 88; cf. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Strange, 226 Ala. 98, 145 So. 425
(1932), Mutual Ben. Health & Acci. Assoc. v. Lesler, 10 F. Supp. 124 D.C.
Ky. 1934) ; but cf. Behrman v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 106 Ohio App.
293, 148 N.E.2d 247 (1958).
66 The Allstate guarantee of renewal endorsement provides:
Allstate guarantees that it will continue to insure you, during the guar-
antee period, for the automobile insurance coverages and limits afforded by
your policy, if you pay premiums when due; but this guarantee terminates
in the event that:
you or any resident of your household, during the guarantee period, has
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newal endorsement provides that the insurer guarantees to continue
the insurance in force for the period of five years. The guarantee is
subject to the payment of premiums and the condition that neither the
insurer nor any member of his household has his driver's license sus-
pended or revoked. The renewal policies are issued in accordance with
the forms and rates of tre insurer in effect at the time of renewal.6 7
The most recent development in this area is a program introduced
by the Kemper Group, which would provide for a "lifetime" guarantee
of renewal for senior citizens. 68 Under the program, if the insured has
been a policyholder of the insurer for at least five years prior to reaching
sixty-five, the insurer agrees to continue to renew the policy for life.
The agreement provides that the suspension or revocation of the driver's
license, the impairment of eyesight, and the nonpayment of premiums
are the only reasons whereby an insurer could refuse to renew. Upon
reaching seventy-two years of age, a policyholder could be required to
provide a physician's certificate as to his physical capability to safely
operate an automobile.
IV. POLICY CANCELLATION PROCEDURE
The cancellation condition of the Standard Family Combination
Automobile Policy (1963 Rev.) provides:
This policy may be canceled by the insured named in Item 1
of the declarations by surrender thereof to the company or any
of its authorized agents or by mailing to the company written
notice stating when thereafter the cancellation shall be effective.
This policy may be canceled by the company by mailing to the
insured named in Item 1 of the declarations at the address
shown in this policy written notice stating when not less than
ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The
mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice.
The time of the surrender or the effective date and hour of can-
cellation stated in the notice shall become the end of the policy
period. Delivery of such written notice either by such insured or
by the company shall be equivalent to mailing.
... Premium adjustment may be made either at the time can-
cellation is effected or as soon as practicable after cancellation
becomes effective, but payment or tender of unearned premium
is not a condition of cancellation.
It is the majority rule that the above language is clear and unam-
biguous, and that mailing of the notice of cancellation to the named
his driver's license suspended or revoked, or is convicted of driving
without having a driver's license.
The guarantee period begins, as to each coverage afforded, on the 60th
day after the effective date of such coverage and continues until the ex-
piration of 5 years starting with the effective date of the policy.
The continuation of your insurance shall be through annual extension
in accordance with the policy forms and rates then in effect for Allstate.
67 Ibid.
68 Insurance Advocate, March 30, 1968.
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insured at the address shown in the policy is sufficient proof of notice
of cancellation, and that proof of receipt of the notice is not required. 9
However, if the language is ambiguous the courts will construe in favor
of the insured and require proof of actual receipt of the notice. 0
There is a great deal of confusion as to whether actual receipt of
notice is required, or whether mailing alone is sufficient proof of notice.
And, as to which of these requirements constitutes the majority rule. 1
Much of this confusion can be attributed to the following situations
wherein the court may require the actual receipt of notice of cancella-
tion, and yet not prevent the parties from making an agreement that
mailing alone is sufficient proof of notice:
(a) The policy provision does not expressly provide that mailing
is sufficient proof of notice.
(b) The insurer did not strictly comply with the policy provision.
(c) The policy provision conflicts with the applicable state statute.7 -2
Thus, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Selkin v. Northland Ins. Co. 73
held that actual receipt of notice is necessary, not because mailing alone
was not sufficient under the policy provision, but because the policy
provision conflicted with the state statute which required actual receipt,
according to the court's interpretation of the statute.
Aside from the above three situations, it is probably the "majority
rule" that where the policy provision authorizes mailing as sufficient
proof of notice, the agreement of the parties in the policy is valid and
actual receipt of notice is not required.7 4
Minnesota adheres to the so-called "minority rule" on notice of
cancellation. The Minnesota rule states that although the language of
the condition provides that mailing constitutes "sufficient proof of no-
tice," the trier of fact is still entitled to find that notice was not received
where the insured testified that he did not receive notice, and that to
hold otherwise would be contrary to public policy. 75
The policy condition generally only requires that the notice be de-
posited in the ordinary mail ;76 however some state statutes require the
insurer to use registered or certified mail.7 7 The insurer has the burden
G0 LONG, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 15.01 (1966).
70 Annot., Actual receipt of cancellation notice -nailed by insurer as prerequisite
to cancellatien of insurance, 64 A.L.R.2d 982 (1959).
71 LONG note 69 supra; Risjord, Construction of Terms of Liability Insurance
with Specific Reference to the Cancellation Condition, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 198,
202 (1959) ; but see, Case Notes, Insurance: Cancellation of Policy: Necessity
of Actual Notice, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 462, 463 (1959).
72 Ibid.
73 90 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1958) ; noted in Case Notes, note 71 supra, and 44 IOWA
L. REv. 808 (1959).
7 LONG, note 69 supra.
75Donarski v. Lardy, 88 N.W.2d 7 (Minn. 1958); This case is noted in 43
MINN. L. REV. 157 (1958) and 11 ALA. L. REV. 189 (1958-59).
7r LONG, note 69 supra at § 15.02.
7 See note 8 supra.
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of proof as to cancellation, and such proof of mailing must be clear
and specific. 78 Thus, the insurer may be required to present substantial
proof of the mailing of cancellation in order to obtain a directed verdict
on this issue. The recent Wisconsin case of Olson v. Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,7 9 reversed a trial court's directed verdict for the
insurer, which had held that the policy had been canceled by the mailing
of a notice of cancellation. The insurer, in support of its motion for a
directed verdict, introduced into evidence a list which contained the
notation that it was a cancellation list. The list contained the name,
address and policy number of the insured, and included a metered
postage stamp of the post office which acknowledged the mailing of the
letters in the list. The court conceded that "proof of mailing, however,
is conclusive of the notice issue,"8 ° but, the court reversed the directed
verdict, stating: "The proof of mailing procedures however, is not suffi-
cient to prove the contents of the mailing. . . .,, The court felt that the
evidence was susceptible to the inference that the list merely showed
an intention on the part of the insurer to include a cancellation notice
in the letter which was unquestionably mailed. The court held that
this inference was permissible despite the fact that the insured failed
to introduce any evidence that he in fact received an empty envelope
from the insurer. Chief Justice Hallows of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court refuted the "logic" of the majority opinion and stated in his dis-
senting opinion:
This court reversed on the ground the evidence is susceptible
of an inference that the notice of cancellation was not mailed.
While the court admits a letter was mailed, it finds an insuffi-
ciency of proof concerning the envelope's contents. I would affirm
because I do not think the evidence shows the defendant insu-
rance company sent an empty envelope to the plaintiff. The in-
ference, which I consider unreasonable, is not sufficient to entitle
one to go to the jury. 2
The Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy requires at
least ten days advance notice of cancellation; questions may arise as
to the effect of a notice of cancellation which states that the cancellation
shall be effective at a time less than ten days from the mailing of the
notice. This problem arose in the recent case of Moore v. Vernon Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co.8 3 in which the court held tlat a notice of cancellation
for a shorter period of time than required is not effective as stated, but
is effective at the expiration of the required period. The court stated
that the purpose of the advance notice requirement is "to enable the
78 LONG, note 69 supra § 15.03.
79 156 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1968).
so Id. at 431.
sl Id. at 433.
82 Id. at 434.
83 234 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. App. 1968).
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insured to obtain insurance with some other company .... -14 The court
held that under the facts of the case the insured had sufficient time in
order to obtain coverage with another company, but had failed to avail
himself of this opportunity.
Of course, the cancellation provisions of the automobile insurance
policy are not the sole means by which a policy may be canceled. The
parties may mutually agree to use a different mode of cancellation.
Thus, the policy may be cancelled by the parties consent, express or
implied from the circumstances, independent of he terms of the policy."5
The language of the notice must be positive and unequivocal in pro-
viding the insured with notice as to cancellation and when it shall be
effective.8 6 It has been held that the cancellation clause insists upon a
single purpose notice of present termination, and that the notice must
not be both a bill for a premium due and in the alternative a termination
of the policy."' Courts have also invalidated cancellation notices because
they were conditional on some future act or omission of the insured.88
The insurer must mail the notice to the correct name and address as
shown in the policy, unless, of course, the insurer can show actual receipt
of the notice.9 The notice of cancellation is effective if mailed to the
name and address of the insured as stated in the policy, despite the fact
that the insured has changed his address, unless it is shown that the
insured had sufficient notice of a change in address of the insured.90 Of
course, this notice of a change in residence must be factually sufficient,
and the insurer is not put on notice of any change in residence by the
mere fact that the insured corresponds with tht insurer from different
addresses. 91
The language of the above stated standard basic automobile policy
clearly indicates that the return of the unearned premium is not a con-
dition precedent to effective cancellation. The balance of the unearned
premium held by the insurer merely creates a debtor-creditor relation-
ship.92 However, if the language is not clear and unambiguous, the court
may find that the return of the unearned premium is a condition prece-
dent to cancellation.
93
84 Id. at 663.
85 Annot., Mutual Rescission, Waiver, Ratification or Estoppel, as regards in-
surer's attempt to rescind policy of insurance or particular provision thereof,
152 A.L.R.2d 95 (1944).
86 LONG, note 69 supra at § 15.08.
87 Relihan, The Uncertain Expiration Date of the Auto Liability Policy: Some
Problems Under Financial Security and Compulsory Insurance Law, 29 INs.
COUISEL J. 639 (1962).
88 Ibid.
85 LONG, note 69 supra § 15.05, 15.06.
90 Annot., Provision of policy for inailing of notice to insured's address as stated
therein, as affected by change of address, 63 A.L.R.2d 570 (1959).
91 LONG, note 69 supra § 15.06.
92 LONG, note 69 supra § 15.06.
93 Annot., Repayment or tender of unearned premium as condition precedent to
exercise by insurer of right to cancel policy, 16 A.L.R.2d 1200 (1951).
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V. EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL
The insurer is under no obligation to notify the insured of the ex-
piration or nonrenewal of the policy in the absence of a statute or an
express or implied agreement to the contrary. Borne v. Dillon94 held
that the Louisiana statute requiring a particular form of notice for
"cancellation" did not apply to the expiration of the policy. The court
stated: "the policy having expired, cancellation was umecessary. ... "9,5
Farmer's Ins. Exchange v. Vincent96 took substantially the same position
in holding that "a letter giving notice of intention not to renew is not
a cancellation .... ,,97 After the Vincent case California enacted a statute
requiring notice of intention not to renew. 9
Of course, the insurer may expressly obligate itself to the issuance
of a renewal policy under endorsements which provide for guarantees
of renewals. The agent of the insurer may also obligate the insurer to
the issuance of a renewal policy either by his express agreement or by
his course of conduct. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tantalo,99 held that
an authorized agent may orally obligate the insurer to the issuance of
a renewal policy, or that such conduct will estop the insurer from the
denial of the issuance of the policy.
VI. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS TO CANCEL OR TO RECEIvE NOTICE
THEREOF
An agent may have the authority to act for either the insured or the
insurer in the cancellation of the policy. The "agent" does not have
to be an insurance agent or broker, but may be other persons such as
lessors or premium finance agents'00 who have the proper authority.
The authority of the agent may either be express or implied. The agent
may have the express or implied authority to act as an agent of the
insurer in order to receive notice of cancellation or to deliver a policy
for cancellation. If the agent has the express authority to receive notice
of cancellation for the insurer, it is a general practice to attach an
endorsement to the policy to that effect.' 0 ' In order for the court to find
that the agent has implied authority to receive notice of cancellation for
91201 So.2d 115 (La. App. 1967).
95Id. at 119.
96 56 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. App. 1967).
97 Id. at 782.
98 CAL. INS. CODE § 670 (Supp. 1967).
99272 F. Supp. 7 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
100 This article will not discuss the problems involved in the cancellation of insu-
rance policies by premium finance agencies. Many times the agency may re-
quire an express power of attorney from the insured authorizing the agency
to effectuate cancellation or receive notice thereof. Some recent cases discus-
sing the problems involved are: Grant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
159 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. App. 1968) and Brinkley v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co.,
199 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1967).
101 LONG, note 69 supra § 15.09.
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the insured, there must be a showing of a clear intention by the insured
to relinquish his right to receive notice.10 2
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Indiana Luinbermens Mut.
Ins. Co. 10 3 held that where the lessor had express authority in the lease
agreement to procure insurance for the lessee, the lessor may also agree
with the insurance company to cancel the insurance, when such action
was pursuant to the procurement of other insurance. Vassel v. Under-
wood 0 held that the broker who had the possession of the policy was
the agent of the insurer rather than the insured. The agent could not act
as the agent of the insured and deliver the policy for cancellation to the
insurer. Therefore, the insured had the right to receive ten days advance
notice of the cancellation pursuant to.the provision in his policy.
The case of International Service Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 10
discussed the authority of an agent to act for the insurer in order to
effectuate cancellation, The insurer authorized the agent to cancel the
policy. The agent instructed one of his employees to effectuate cancella-
tion. The court held that the action of the employee in canceling the
policy constituted cancellation "by the company" under the applicable
policy provision.
VII. NOTICE TO Loss PAYEE
A loss payee is a mortgagee or a conditional vendor who has a
security interest in the insured automobile. The mortgagee can protect
his security interest in the insured automobile by having an endorsement
making him a loss payee. It is assumed that such endorsement would
apply only to the collision and the physical damage coverage provisions
of the insurance policy. A loss payee obviously would want to be notified
about any cancellation of the insurance policy, and a recent case has
decided the question as to whether it is necessary to notify a loss payee
in order to effectively cancel the coverage. Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Commonwealth Mut. Ins. Co.100 held that an insurer is not required to
give notice of cancellation to a loss payee. In that case the Ford Motor
Credit Co. was named as a loss payee in an endorsement to the policy.
The cancellation provision stated that cancellation may be effected by
the mailing of the notice to "named insured in Item No. I." Ford Motor
Credit was not named in Item No. 1. The court stated that it would
only be necessary to give notice to a loss payee if he is a named insured
or if there is a specific endorsement requiring notice to him.
The State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. Standard Risk
Policy eliminates the problem of the Ford case by including a provision
102 Ibid.
103 382 F.2d 839 (5 Cir. 1967).
104 85 Ill. App.2d 222, 229 N.E.2d 354 (1967).
105421 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App. 1967).
106420 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App. 1967).
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which requires notice of the termination of the policy to the loss payee07
Georgia, Maine and Massachusetts have statutes which require that
notice of cancellation be given to a loss payee.10 8
VIII. THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION FOR MISREPRESENTATION
In general, a material misrepresentation in the application for insu-
rance or in the policy will void the policy. 0 9 If the insurer issues a
policy based upon a material misrepresentation, upon the discovery of
the falsity of the representation the insurer ma" elect to rescind the
policy.1 0
Misrepresentations, whether they apply to the named insured or to
any actual or potential operator of the insured vehicle, are generally held
to be material when they relate to the previous driving record of viola-
tions or accidents,'1 ' and previous cancellations or denials of automobile
insurance.
The test of materiality is the probable effect the representation may
have had upon the decision of the underwriter. 1 2 Miller v. Plains Ins.
Co. 3 provides a good discussion of what amounts to a material mis-
representation.
A misrepresentation that would likely affect the conduct of a
reasonable man in respect to his transaction with another is
material. Materiality, however, is not determined by the actual
influence the representation exerts, but rather by the possibility
of its so doing. A representation made to an insurer that is
material to its determination as to what premium to fix or whether
it will accept the risk, relates to a fact actually material to the
risk which the insurer is asked to assume .... 114
107 The clause provides:
If a mortgage owner, conditional vendor, or assignee is named in the
exceptions, loss, if any, under coverages D, D-50, F and G shall be payable
to the named insured and to such additional interest as such interest may
appear, and this insurance as to such additional interest shall not be
invalidated by any act or negligence of the mortgagor or owner, nor by
any change in the title or ownership, nor by any error or inadvertence in
the description of the automobile until after notice of termination of the
policy shall be given to such mortgage owner, conditional vendor, mort-
gagee or assignee stating when not less tran 10 days thereafter such termin-
ation shall be effective; provided, the lien-holder shall notify the company
within 10 days of any change of interest or ownership which shall come
to the knowledge of said lien-holder and failure to do so will render this
policy null and void.
1os ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, § 1051 (Supp. 1967); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 175, § 187 (C) (Supp) 1966) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2430.1 (Supp. 1967).
Cf. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Glennville Bk., 11 Ga. App. 174, 141 S.E.2d 168
(1965).
109 For a more detailed discussion of this area see, Magarick, The Application
and the Declarations in the Standard Automobile Policy, 1962 Ins. L. J. 741.
100 LONG, note 69 supra § 19.02.
"I Annot., Materiality of false statements by applicant for automobile insurance
as to license revocation or suspension or traffic violation, 89 A.L.R.2d 1027
(1963).
112 LONG, note 69 supra § 19.03.
13 409 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1966).
114 Id. at 774.
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However, the insurer's agent can so conduct the application proce-
dure so as to prevent any inference that the misrepresentation was
material. Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co."' held that the agent
so ignored the driving record of the applicant that the court doubted
that, if the representation had been stated truthfully, it would "... . have
been any more important than the other matters about which the agent
was told and which he failed to note. .. ."
Taylor v. Black"1 7 held that the insured's misrepresentations as to
the previous cancellation of the insured's wife's auto insurance were
material, and voided the policy. Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins.
Co."" held that the insured's misrepresentations as to his previous driv-
ing records and record of insurance cancellations were material, and
voided the policy. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni'19 held that misrepresenta-
tions as to the suspension of the insured's husband's driver's license
and as to his potential operation of the insured vehicle, voided the policy.
Several of the more recent cases have discussed the materiality of
the insured's misrepresentations as to the actual ownership or operation
of the insured vehicle. 120 The court stated in Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Dennis12 1 that: "The character and judgment of the owner
as well as his or her true status, have a definite bearing upon the risk
involved."' 22
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allen 2 3 held that the transfer
of title of the insured automobile into the name of another, in order that
the original owner obtain insurance, constitutes a material misrepresen-
tation. However, the insurer must show that it has attempted to elicit
the "actual" ownership and operation from the insured. Thus, the court
in Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Burdick,124 stated that the insured is
not required to: "... engage in surmise as to such details as might be
desired by the insurer and to volunteer them without being asked .... 125
The court held that the policy was not defeated since the insurer failed
to make sufficient inquiry as to the actual ownership and operation of
the insured vehicle.
There is conflicting authority as to the duty of the applicant for
insurance to read the application, and to be bound by the answers there-
115427 P.2d 29 (N.M. 1967).
116Id. at 31.
117258 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Mo. E.D. 1966) But see, S.C. Code § 46-750.54 (Supp.
1967) which expressly provides that misrepresentations as to previous cancella-
tions shall be deemed immaterial.
11"427 P.2d 21 (N.M. 1967).
11" 98 N.J. Super. 154, 236 A.2d 402 (1967).
120Annot., Misrepresentation by applicant for automobile liability insurance as
to ownership of vehicle as material to risk, 33 A.L.R.2d 948 (1954).
121232 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. App. 1968).
122 Id. at 754.
12 388 F.2d 126 (5 Cir. 1967).
124 388 F.2d 205 (7 Cir. 1967).
12 Id. at 207.
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in, despite the fact he did not read the application. 12 6 Miller v. Plains
Ins. Co.' 2 7 held that the applicant is bound to know the content of the
application whether she reads it or not. And this duty is not affected
by the fact that she trusted or relied upon the agent to prepare the
application where there is no evidence of fraud or mistake on the part
of the agent. In the Miller case the evidence showed that the applicant
was of average intelligence and ability, and no doubt was cast upon her
ability to read or comprehend the application. The court in Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Meloni"28 held that the insured may not claim that she was "mis-
taken" as to the meaning of the application when the language is clear
and unambiguous. However, the previously discussed case of Tsosie v.
Foundation Reserve Ins. Co."2 9 points out that the agent may so conduct
the application procedure so as to bar the allegation of a duty to read
the application.
If the insurer has knowledge of the misrepresentation and despite
such knowledge issues the policy, it may not later avoid the policy on the
basis of the misrepresentation. This principle can be justified either on
the basis of waiver or estoppel, or because the insurer had full knowl-
edge of the falsity of the misrepresentation and it would be entirely
inconsistent for the insurer to claim that it relied on the truth of the
representaiton. Several questions arise in this area. To what extent is
the insurer held to have knowledge of all of the information in its files?
To what extent is the insurer under an obligation to investigate the truth
or falsity of representations? To what extent is the insurer held bound
to the knowledge of its agents?
Taylor v. Black'" held that the insurer's knowledge of the insured's
wife's maiden name did not constitute knowledge of her subsequent
married name. The court in Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. 31
stated:
Notice of this one item of concealment . . . does not operate as
notice of all the other items either concealed or misstated by
plaintiff. . . .Recognition of the processes involved ... in the
orderly and proper conduct of an insurance business compels a
recognition of the fact that every sales agent and (sic) other
officer or employee of an insurance company can not be charged
with notice of all that exists in the company's files. ... 131
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni' 3 held that the use of an independent
investigation did not absolve the insured:
12G LoNG, LIABILTY INsUTRANcr, §§ 17.25, 19.04 (1966).
"2 See note 113 supra.
2 SSee note 119 supra.
129 See note 115 supra.
130 258 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Mo. E.D. 1966).
131 See note 118 supra.
132 Id. at 28.
33 See note 119 supra.
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from speaking the truth nor did it lessen the right of the company
to rely upon her statement, unless the investigation disclosed
facts sufficient to expose the falsity of the representation made
or was of such nature as to place upon the company the duty of
making further inquiry. .... 134
The recent case of Union Ins. Exch. v. Gaul"1 5 seems to conflict with
the Modisette case in that it helds that knowledge of one item of con-
cealment may put the insurer on notice of other possible concealments.
The Gaul case is in accord with the principle stated in the Meloni case
that the insurer may no longer rely upon the statements in the applica-
tion if investigation exposes a falsity of such a nature so as to put
upon the insurer the duty of making further inquiry.
In the Gaul case the insured misrepresented his prior insurance can-
cellations, his prior license revocation, and his traffic violations. The
insurer originally rejected the application upon the discovery of the
prior insurance cancellation and the fact that this was misrepresented.
However, the insurer, upon the insistence of its agent, reconsidered and
accepted a second application. The agent knew that the prior cancella-
tion was because of "too many accidents" and it was shown that both
the agent and the insurer could have obtained more information as to
the prior cancellation. The court stated that because of the insurer's
imputed knowledge of the insured's "too many accidents," and because
of the insurer's knowledge that the insured had lied in the application:
". .. the insurer is estopped from rescinding this policy because it
possessed facts that would have put a prudent insurer on further inquiry
that would have disclosed the falsity....
In the Gaul case the court imputed the knowledge of the agent to
the insurer. It may be stated that knowledge of an authorized agent
within the scope of his authority constitutes knowledge to the principal.
However, this principle does not apply where the agent, in collusion
with the insured, is operating a fraud upon the insurer. The court in
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allen'" stated that collusion
may consist of the agent being placed "in the light of having assisted
in bringing about the consummation of the fraudulent transaction...."131
Would the principles of the Meloni and Gaul cases apply to statutory
revisions which would limit the right of the insurer to cancel after a
sixty day underwriting period? Under the earlier "model bills," one
permissible reason for cancellation was that "the policy was obtained
through a material misrepresentation." The more recent AIA-AMIA
"model bill" would eliminate material misrepresentation as a permissible
reason for cancellation. Would the enactment of such a proposal also
134 Id. 236 A.2d at 405-406.135-F.2d-1968, CCH Auto. Ins. Cases 7559 (7 Cir. 1968).
136 Id. 1968 CCH Auto. Ins. Cases 7561.
137 See note 123 supra.
3SId. at 131.
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eliminate the right of the insurer to rescind for a material misrepresen-
tation? Taylor v. Black139 held that a limitation upon cancellation in
the insurance policy did not bar the insurer's right to rescind. However,
the question remains would the principles of the Taylor case also apply
to statutory limitations upon the right of the insurer to cancel?
The courts could interpret a statutory revision such as the AIA-
AMIA "model bill" as operating as a statutory estoppel, which would
bar an insurer's rescission for misrepresentations which the insurer
failed to discover during the sixty-day underwriting period. The courts
could reason that the purpose of the sixty-day underwrting period is
to allow the insurer to discover material* misrepresentation. AMIA, in
a release dated February 15, 1968, stated that during the sixty-day under-
writing period "the' company would have the right to turn down the
applicant if its investigation disclosed misrepresentation. . . ." Perhaps
the insurer's failure to discover misrepresentations would operate as an
estoppel barring any rescission of the policy after the sixty-day under-
writing period, in the absence of affirmative conduct on the part of
the insured preventing discovery of the true facts.
IX. LIMITATIONS UPON THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION
There are limitations upon the insurer's right of rescission in both
the case law and in particular statutes. These limitations may operate
to make the insurance policy valid and enforceable despite the existence
of grounds for rescission. These limitations may prevent the insurer
from rescinding the policy against certain third parties, or they may also
prevent a rescission in respect to the insured.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis'4 0 held that the rights of
third parties injured by the negligence of the insured are no greater
than the rights of the insured. Thus, a rescission does not deprive such
injured third parties of any vested property rights. However, Southern
General Ins. Co. v. O'Keefel4 ' held that a court order rescinding the
insurance policy could not affect the rights of injured third parties who
were neither served, nor were a party to the action. McLane v. Farmers
Ins. Exch.14 2 held that a default judgment by the insurer against the
insured rescinding the policy would not bar recovery by an injured
third party, since his rights "vested ,either at the time of the accident
or at the time of the implied waiver of the right to rescind....
A. Compulsory Auto Insurance and
Financial Responsibility Laws
The purpose of compulsory auto insurance and financial responsibil-
ity laws is to protect the members of the public who are injured as a
130 See note 117 supra.
140 232 N.E.2d 750 (III. App. 1968).
14,275 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Md. 1967).
142432 P.2d 98 (Mont. 1967).
143 Id. at 100.
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result of the negligence of the financially irresponsible motorist.' M4
Therefore, insurers who issue policies under these laws may not be
able to rescind the policy against innocent third parties after the occur-
rence of an accident despite the material misrepresentations of the in-
sured. However, these laws may only afford protection to the innocent
third parties, and not to the insured who practices a fraud upon the
insurer. Thus, the Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy
(1963 Rev.) has a provision for reimbursement under its clause relating
to financial responsibility laws.1 45 Under this provision, the insured
agrees to reimburse the insurer for claims which the insurer is required
to pay under the financial responsibility laws, but which the insurer
would not be required to pay under the terms of the policy. In Erie Ins.
Exch. v. Gosnell146 the insurer sought reimbursement from its insured
under this type or provision.
Almost all of the states have financial or safety responsibility laws.' 47
It should be emphasized that these laws may have two separate and
144 LONG, note 126 supra, § 15.16.
145 The provision reads:
When this policy is certified as proof of financial responsibility for the
responsibility for the future under the provisions of any motor vehicle
financial responsibility law, such insurance as is afforded by this policy
for bodily injury liability or for property damage liability shall comply
with the provisions of such law to the extent of the coverage and limits
of liability required by such law, but in no event in excess of the limits of
liability stated in this policy. The insured agrees to reimburse the company
for any payment made by the company which it would not have been ob-
ligated to make under the terms of this policy except for the agreement
contained in this paragraph.
146246 Md. 724, 230 A.2d 467 (1967)
147 Massachusetts is the only state without a safety or financial responsibility law,
however this state has compulsory auto liability insurance. The following
statutes provide for safety or financial responsibility, in forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia:
ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74(42)-74(83) (Supp. 1965) ; ALAS. STAT. § 28.20.010-
28.20.640; Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1101-28-1225 (Supp. 1967) ; ARK. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 75-1401-75-1493 (Supp. 1967); CAL. VEH. CODE § 16000-16503
(Supp. 1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13(7) (1)-13(7) (39); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 14-107-14-135 (Supp. 1966) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2901-2972(Supp. 1966) ; D.C. CODE § 40(417) (40) (498C) (Supp. 1966) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 324.011-324.271 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 92A (601) (92A) (621)(Supp. 1967); HAWAIr REv. LAWS § 160(80) (160) (126) (Supp. 1965) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49(1501)-49-(1540) (Supp. 1967); ILL. Riw. STAT. ch. 95Y2,§ 7-101-7503 (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47(1044)-47-(1088) (1967);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.A.1-321.A.39 (1968) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-722-
8-769 (Supp. 1967); KY, REV. STAT. § 187.290-187.990 (Supp. 1967) ; LA. REv.
STAT. § 32.851-32:1043 (Supp. 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 29, § 781-788
(Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 66Y § 116-149A (1967) ; MicH. STAT. ANN.§ 257.501-257.532 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. § 170.21-170.58 (Supp. 1967);
MIss. CODEANN. § 8285(01)-8285(41) (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.010-
303.370 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53(418)-53-(458) (Supp.
1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60(561)-60-(569) (Supp. 1967); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 485.010-485.420 (1963) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268:1-27 (1967) ; N.J. REv.
STAT. § 39:6-23-39:6-104 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64(24) (42)-64-(24) (104) (Supp. 1965) ; N.Y. VEH. 6 TRAFFic LAW § 330-368 (Supp. 1967) ;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1-20-279.39 (Supp. 1967) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 39(16)-(01)-39-(16.1) (23) (Supp. 1967); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01-4509.99
(Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7(101)-7-(505) (Supp. 1967);
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distinct provisions. They may require evidence of security to respond
for damages for past accidents, 148 which usually requires the filing of
an SR-21 form, or they may require evidence of the proof of financial
responsibility for future accidents.14 9 The major weakness of these
laws is that the financially irresponsible motorist is usually allowed one
accident before he is required to file proof of financial responsibility. 150
Many of the statutes provide that if the automobile insurance is is-
sued under the financial responsibility laws, the liability of the insurer
shall be absolute after the occurrence of loss.1 51 Thus, the insurer may
ORE. REV. STAT. § 486.011-486.991 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1401-1436(1967) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31(1)-31-(33) (6) (Supp. 1967) ; S.C. CODE§ 46.701-46.750.28 (Supp. 1967) ; S.D. CODE § 44.03A01-44.03A70 (1960); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59(1201) -59- (1240) (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. Art.
67.01h (Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41(12) (1)-41-(12) (4) 41 (Supp.
1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 801-888 (Supp. 1967) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-
388-46.1-514 (1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.29.010-46.29. 640 (Supp.
1967); W. VA. CODE tit. 56, § 17D(1) (1)-17D(6) (7) (Supp. 1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 344.01-344.52 (Supp. 1968); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31(347)-31-
(315) (Supp. 1967).
248 WIS. STAT. § 344.12 (1965) ; For a discussion of safety and financial respon-
sibility laws see, Urbom, Safety Responsibility Acts: Availability of Policy
Defenses After Certifying Presence of Insurance, 29 INS. COUNSEL J. 220
(1962) ; Miller, The New SR-21 in Wisconsin, 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 342 (1958);
Cowie, Administration of Safety Responsibility Laws, 22 INS. COUNSEL J. 465
(1955).
149 Wis. STAT. § 344.24 (1965).
150 The following articles discuss the financial responsibility acts and other laws
which attempt to solve the problem of the financially irresponsible motorist:
Jacobs, The Financially Irre sponsible Motorist: A Survey of State Legisla-
tion, 10 VILL. L. REv. 545 (1965); Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TEX.
L. REv. 154 (1959) ; Murphy & Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Un-
insured Motorist, 47 GEo. L. J. 700 (1959); and Ward, The Uninsuered Motor-
ist; National and International Protection Presently Available and Compara-
tive Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1960).
-51 The following statutes provide that policies issued under the State Financial
Responsibility Act the liability shall be absolute upon the occurrence of loss:
ALA. CODE tit. 36 § 74(62) (Supp. 1965); ALAS. STAT. § 28.20.440 (1959);
AaRz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1170 (Supp. 1967); ARK. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 75-
1466 (Supp. 1967) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-23 (2) (a) (Supp. 1960);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2903 (Supp. 1966); D.C. CODE § 40-474 (Supp. 1966);
HAWAII REv. LAWS § 160-107 (Supp. 1965); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95Y, § 7-317
(Supp. 1967) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-750 (Supp. 1967) ; Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 187.490 (Supp. 1967); LA. Rv. STAT. 32:900 (F) (1) (Supp. 1966); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 29, § 786 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 66Y, § 131
(Supp. 1967); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 112 (Supp. 1966); MIcH.
Coax. LAws ANN. § 257.520 (Supp. 1967) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 8285-21 (Supp.
1966) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 53-
438 (Supp. 1967); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 60-538 (Supp. 1967); NE . REv. STAT.
§ 485.3091 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268.16 (1967); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 39:6-48 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-87 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-27921 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16-20 (Supp. 1967);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.53 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 7-324 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. § 486.551 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, § 1421 (1967) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-32-24 (Supp. 1967) ;
S.C. CODE § 46-702 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE § 44.03A52 (1960); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9-1223 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. Art. 6701h, § 21 (Supp.
1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-21 (Supp. 1967) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-511
(1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.29.490 (Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE
§ 17D-4-12 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 344.33 (Supp. 1967) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 31-306 (Supp. 1967).
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not be able to rescind the policy despite the material misrepresentations
of the insured. New Jersey follows the rule that if the policy is issued
under the financial responsibility law, it may not be rescinded. However,
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wall"2 held that, although the liability
under the policy may be absolute as to innocent third parties injured
in the accident, it was void as to the insured because of his misrepre-
sentation. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meloni 53 the wife obtained the insu-
rance policy, which was covered by the financial responsibility law, by
means of material misrepresentation. The husband was subsequently
involved in an accident while driving the insured auto. The court held
that while the policy may not be voidable as to innocent third parties, it
was voidable against the wife who was the "named insured" and against
the husband who was an "insured" under his wife's policy.
The case of Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co.'5 held that policies issued
under New York's compulsory auto insurance law may not be rescinded
ab initio for a material misrepresentation. The court held that it could
not reconcile the right of rescission ab initio with the general statutory
scheme of compulsory auto insurance, despite the fact that the particular
statute relied upon applied only to "cancellation." The court stated that
the term "cancellation" in the statute is not used in its technical insu-
rance sense but in its colloquial sense as meaning a termination of the
coverage in any manner prior to its expiration. The court refused to
recognize any distinction between the rights of innocent third parties and
the insured who had practiced a fraud upon the insurer. Thus, the in-
surer could not rescind despite the fact that there was not an accident
or third parties involved. The court stated that the only way coverage
could be terminated prior to the expiration of the policy was prospec-
The following statutes seem to be more limited in their application, and pro-
vide that policy issued under the financial responsibility laws shall not be an-
nulled by an "agreement" between the insurer and insured after the occurrence
of loss:
Wis. STAT. § 344.33 (6) (a) (1965)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1521 (Supp. 1967).
The following statutes are substantially similar to the Idaho and Wisconsin
statutes, except they do not seem to be limited in their application to only
policies issued under the financial responsibility laws.
ARIz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1123 (Supp. 1967); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 181-432(Supp. 1965) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.684 (Supp. 1967) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 22:639
(Supp. 1966).
The following statutes seem to make liability absolute after the occurrence
of loss and are not limited to Financial Responsibility Laws.
ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 11 (Supp. 1965) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 38-175 (Supp.
1967) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.195 (Supp. 1967) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.05
(Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3625 (Supp. 1967); UTAH. CODE
ANN. § 31-19-25 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.18.320 (Supp.
1967) ; W. VA. CODE § 3391 (Supp. 1967).
15292 N.J. Super. 92, 222 A.2d 282 (1967).
153 See note 119 supra.
154192 N.Y.S.2d 610, aff'd 212 N.Y.S.2d 77, 173 N.E.2d 47 (1961); noted in 12
SYRAcusE L. REV. 141 (1961); but coverage may be defeated by failure to
give timely notice of the accident, NELLI v. NATIONAL SUR. CORP., 229 N.Y.S.2d
174 (N.Y. App. 1962).
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tively pursuant to the advance notice provisions of the statute. However,
the court did not foreclose the possibility that the insurer could have
other remedies against an insured who had perpetrated a fraud. The
court stated:
We are not called upon to say at this time what remedy, if any,
an insurance company may have against an insured in tort or
quasi contract for fraudulently inducing it to issue an insurance
policy which it was thereafter forbidden to terminate except on
the statutory notice .... 155
It would seem that an enactment in New York of a statute similar
to the AIA-AMIA "model bill" would prevent an insurer from cancel-
ing or rescinding the insurance policy, anytime during the policy period,
after the initial sixty-day underwriting period, except for the nonpay-
ment of premium and the loss of driving privileges.
B. Assigned Risk Plans
At least thirty states authorize or require insurers doing business in
the state to participate in an assigned risk plan,' 56 and it is reported that
the remaining states have voluntary programs. 15 7 There is conflicting
authority as to whether policies issued under these plans may be res-
cinded for misrepresentation. The case of Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
O'Connor58 held that New York's assigned risk plan, which provides
for only prospective cancellation, eliminates the insurer's right to avoid
the policy for material misrepresentation. The court based its decision
upon the fact that the fairly extensive statutory structure regulating the
plan failed to mention the right of rescission. The court chided the in-
15 Id. 192 N.Y.S.2d 619.
156 ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74(76) (Supp. 1965) ; ALAS. STAT. § 28.20.580; ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1223A (Supp. 1967) ; ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-1486 (Supp.
1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-13-16 (1964); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV.§ 14-130 (Supp. 1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2907 (Supp. 1966); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 324.181 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-617 (Supp. 1967);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 160-121 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1535
(Supp. 1967) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 953/2, § 7-501 (Supp. 1967) ; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2101-40-2104 (Supp. 1967) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 32:1043 (Supp. 1966);
ME. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 2775 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 48A,
§ 243(n), 240A (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8285-35 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 303.210 (Supp. 1967) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53-452 (Supp. 1967) ;
NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 446, p. 1202, Session Laws (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 412:19, 412:19a (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21-1-58-21-13 (Supp. 1965);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20279.34 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4509. 70
(Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-501 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 31-33-8 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE § 31.3501-1 (1960); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59-1238 (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. Art. 6701h, § 35
(Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-497-503 (1966).
157 Insurance Information Institute, News Release, April 18, 1968.
15S 207 N.Y.S.2d 679, 170 N.E.2d 681 (1960) ; noted in 12 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 528
(1961). The principles of this case and the previously discussed cases in the
area of compulsory auto insurance and financial responsibility were errone-
ously applied to a regular voluntary automobile insurance policy in the case
of Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1968 CCH Auto Ins. Cases
7787 (Cal. App. 1968).
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surer for failing to discover the misrepresentation in its initial investiga-
tion and stated:
If that investigation had been performed properly the insured's
misrepresentation would have been discovered. . . .While ...
(the insurer) may ultimately be held on a policy obtained by
fraud, its liability is in a very real sense attributable to its own
fault, and the true beneficiary is not the wrongdoer, but his
innocent victims.159
However, it is not entirely clear that other states would follow the
New York decision in the Aetna case. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Saccio160 held that a policy issued under the Virginia Assigned
Risk Plan could be voided for a material misrepresentation. The court
distinguished the Aetna case stating that the Virginia plan was "not
adopted by legislative requirement, but through legislative permis-
sion. .... 161
As mentioned previously in this article, the Wisconsin Assigned Risk
Plan expressly provides that the plan does not abrogate the insurer's
right of rescission. 6 2 It does not seem too speculative to surmise that
the assigned risk plans in other states may have provisions similar to
the Wisconsin provision and that the New York rule may be the
minority rule.
C. Waiver, Estoppel and Election
The doctrines of wai -er, estoppel and election may operate to pre-
vent an insurer from rescinding a policy of insurance which was obtained
by a material misrepresentation. These doctrines differ in several re-
spects from the previously mentioned limitations upon rescission. They
may apply with equal force to both the insured and the innocent third
parties, whereas the previously mentioned liimitations may only apply
to innocent third parties. They may also operate to extend liability
despite the fact of an effective cancellation of the policy, and some courts
hold that they may operate to extend the coverage of the policy to a
situation wherein no coverage existed. This article will not present a
detailed discussion of these doctrines, but will merely highlight some
recent cases.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, estoppel
on the other hand is not consensual in character but defeats inequitable
conduct, where such conduct induced the insured to rely and change
his position to his detriment. 163
The case of McLane v. Farmers Ins. Exch.16 4 held that after the
insurer discovered facts entitling it to rescind, its affirmative acts in
1'59Id. 170 N.E.2d 684.160204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268 (1963).
161 Id. 133 S.E.2d 274.
162 See note 58 supra.
163 LONG, note 126 supra § 17.14.
164 See note 142 supra.
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paying claims and accepting premium operated as a waiver of its
right to rescind. Panizzi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 6 5 held
that the insurer's acceptance of part payment of the premium and its
request for payment of the full premium in order to reinstate the policy,
did not operate as a waiver of its effective notice of cancellation. Insu-
rance Co. of St. Louis v. Yates 66 held that the insurer waived its right
to void the policy, where two months subsequent to the rejection of the
insured's application, its adjuster executed a settlement release with one
of the parties injured in the accident.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tantalo67 held that the insurer was
estopped from denying that the policy in question had expired, where
the agent had promised to issue a renewal policy. The insured relied
on the agent, and refrained from making other insurance arrangements.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Vincent' s denied the insured's claim of estoppel
on the basis of a letter sent to a mortagagee erroneously stating the
cancellation date of the policy, where under the facts of the case the
insured had not been aware of the letter. International Service Ins. Co.
of Maryland Cas. Co.,' 6 ° also denied a claim of estoppel based upon a
second erroneous notice of cancellation where the insured did not re-
ceive the notice.
In Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co.,y 0 the court used the doctrine of es-
toppel to extend the policy coverage to include non-licensed drivers,
despite the policy exclusion. The insurer's control of the investigation
and the settlement of claims over an extended period of time operated
as an estoppel, and the court stated it would presume a prejudice to the
insured under these facts.
The court in the Sneed case also held that the letter of the insurer
reserving its right to disclaim, did not bar the application of the doc-
tine of estoppel, since the insured was not given the opportunity to
reject or accept the proposition of the insurer.
X. CONCLUSION
State legislatures which have not enacted laws changing the rules
on the cancellation and nonrenewal of automobile insurance policies
can expect to see the introduction of proposed statutes of future legis-
lative sessions. It is not inconceivable that even those states which have
recently enacted legislation can expect to receive suggestions for re-
visions that will impose greater restrictions upon the insurer's right of
cancellation or nonrenewal.
165 386 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1967).
166 200 So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 1967).
167 272 F. Supp. 7 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
16856 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1967).
169 421 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App. 1967).
170 237 A.2d 289 (N.J. App. 1967).
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Proposals for change should be carefully analyzed in light of their
purported purpose and the problems which they attempt to solve. These
proposals must be considered within the total framework of insurance
law for if they are merely considered on an ad hoc basis, their adoption
may create problems greater than those which they purport to solve.
There is little question that problems exist as to the cancellation and
nonrenewal of automobile insurance policies and that legislation is
needed to prevent arbitrary and capricous cancellations. Legislation
should be enacted which would limit the reasons for which insurers
may cancel automobile insurance policies since any prior cancellation
may hinder the policyholder in obtaining future coverage or may in-
crease the premium which he would be required to pay, despite the in-
creasing tendency to ignore prior cancellations as a determining factor
in underwriting. The policyholder should receive adequate advance
notice of a cancellation or nonrenewal, to allow him sufficient time to
correct a notice based upon a "mistaken belief" or to obtain other cov-
erage. The public should be protected from motorists who may become
financially irresponsible as a result of an arbitrary cancellation.
The insurance industry is often criticized as being "defensive" in its
attitude towards new statutory regulation. Thus critics say the industry
only supports and proposes new legislation, when there is a clear and
present danger that the critics may be able to rally sufficient public
support for either the enactment of unreasonable state legislation, or
for the intervention of the federal government. The authors of this
article can not accept the "generalization" that the insurance industry is
merely "defensive" since this generalization fails to consider the many
statutory and voluntary innovations which have come from within the
insurance industry itself.
Although the authors believe that it is necessary that state legislation
be enacted we do not advocate the adoption of a particular statute or
particular provisions. We believe that the nature and the content of
the legislation to be adopted, should be left to the able judgment of the
state legislatures, after due consultation with the responsible representa-
tives of the insurance industry. However, any solution should give due
regard to the interests of the individual policyholder, the policyholders
as a group, the insurance industry, and the public in general. The solu-
tion should protect the individual policyholder from arbitrary action
but should not require policyholders as a group to pay the cost of frau-
dulent and irresponsible policyholders. It should consider the interest
of the public in eliminating the financially irresponsible motorist from
the highways, but should not unduly regulate the activities of responsible
insurers. It is hoped that this article may help toward a better under-
standing of the problems involved and of the alternatives available so
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that the proposed solutions may be judged in light of their effect upon
prior law, and their prospective judicial interpretation.
XI. APPENDIX
STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS-
CANCELLATION AND NONRENEWAL
State
California
Delaware
Mlorid
Georgi
Illinois
Indian
Iowa
Kansa
Limitations
Upon Right of
Cancellation
Cal. Admin.
Code tit. 10
Art 7.5, § 2371
Del. Code Ann.
Tit. 21, § 2908
(Supp. 1967)
a Fla. Stat. Ann.
(a) § 627.0852
(Supp. 1967)
a Ga. Code Ann.
(a) § 56-2430
(Supp. 1967)
III. Rev. Stat.
(a) ch. 73 §755.3
(Supp. 1967)
a Ins. Dept. Bull.
58, Aug. 22,
1966 (b)
s Kan. Gen.
(a) Stat. Ann.
ch. 271, p. 513
Sessions Laws
(1967)
Maine
Requirement of
Advance Notice
of Cancellation
Cal. Ins. Code
§ 651 (Supp.
1967)
Vla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852(3)
(Supp. 1967)
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2430(4)
(Supp. 1967)
III. Rev. Stat.
ch. 73 §755.4
(Supp. 1967)
Requirement of
Advance Notice
of Non-Renewal
Cal. Ins.
Code § 670
(Supp. 1967)
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 627.0852
(Supp. 1967)
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 56-2430(5)
(Supp. 1967)
III. Rev. Stat.
ch. 73 §755.4
(Supp. 1967)
Iowa Code
Ann.
§ 515.80-.81
(1968)
Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 40-278
(1967)
Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
ch. 24, §1051
(1966)
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Maryland
(a)
Massachusetts
Michigan Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 24.13220
(Supp. 1968)
sota Minn. Stat.
(a), § 72A.141-.148
(Supp. 1967)
ri Mo. Rev. Stat.
(a) § 379.202
(Supp. 1967)
New York
No. Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-310(b)
(Supp. 1967)
No. Dakota
(a)
Rhode Island R.I. Ins. Dept.
So. Carolina
Reg. Aug. 15,
1962
S.C. Code
§ 46-750.61
(Supp. 1967)
Md. Ann. Code
Art. 48A,
§ 240A(d)
(1968)
Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann.
Ch. 175, § 113
A(2)
(Supp. 1966)
Mich. Stat.
Ann.
§ 24.13224(3)
1324(2)
(Supp. 1968)
Minn. Stat.
§ 72A. 143
(Supp. 1967)
N.Y. Vehicle &
Traffic Law
§ 313
(Supp. 1967)
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 2 0-310(a)
(Supp. 1967)
N.D. Cent.
Code
§ 26-02-32-33
(Supp. 1967)
S.C. Code
§ 46-138
(Supp. 1967)
Md. Ann. Code
Art. 48A, § 240
A(d) (1967)
Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann.
Ch. 175, § 113F
(Supp. 1966)
Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 24.13204(2)
(Supp. 1968)
Minn. Stat.
§ 72A.144
(Supp. 1967)
N.Y. Vehicle &
Traffic Law
§ 313
(Supp. 1967)
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 2 0- 3 10(a),
(c)
(Supp. 1967)
N.D. Cent. Code
§ 26-02-34
(Supp. 1967)
S.C. Code
§ 46-138
(Supp. 1967)
Minnes
Missot
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So. Dakota
(a)
Virginia
S.D. Code
H-684, eft.
7-1-68 Session
Laws (1968)
(c)
ngton Wash. Rev.
(a) Code Ann.
§ 48.18-2.2
(Supp. 1967)
Virginia W. Va. Code
(a) § 33-6A
(Supp. 1967)
nsin Wis. Stat. Ann.
(a) § 204.341 (4)
(Supp. 1967)
S.D. Code
H-684, eff.
7-1-68 Session
Laws (1968)
Va. Code Ann.
38.1-70.9
(Supp. 1966)
Wash. Rev.
Code Ann
§ 48.18-2.1
(Supp. 1967)
Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 204.341(5)
(a)
(Supp. 1967)
S.D. Code
H-684, eff.
7-1-68 Sessions
-Laws (1968)
Va. Code Ann.
38.1-70.9
(Supp. 1966)
Wash. Rev.
Code Ann
§ 48.18-2.1
(Supp. 1967)
W. Va. Code
§ 33-6A-4
(Supp. 1967)
Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 204.341 (5)
(a)
(Supp. 1967)
(a)-Statutes adopted or revised since January 1, 1967.
(b)-The regulation requires that policies issued in the state contain
specified limitations upon cancellation or a conspicuous statement
that the policy "contains none of the minimum standards regarding
policy cancellation promulgated by the Insurance Department of
Indiana."
(c)-It has been reported that by an administrative order of the Virginia
State Corporation Commission certain standard limitations upon
cancellation were prescribed as mandatory for use by all automo-
bile insurers writing business in state. However, the authors of
this article have been unable to obtain a citation to this order.
Editor's Note-Recent Legislative Developments:
It has been reported that a bill similar to the most recent AIA-
AMIA proposal has passed the New York State Legislature and
has been sent to the governor. Tennessee recently enacted a statute
which would limit the reasons for cancellation and require that
the reasons be furnished to the insured. It is reported that Penn-
sylvania recently enacted a cancellation-nonrenewal statute which
may be the most comprehensive of any heretofore proposed or
enacted. The statute includes the provisions of the most recent
AIA-AMIA proposal. It also includes provisions similar to the
recent Wisconsin statute (note 35 supra), which would apply not
only to cancellation and nonrenewal but also to the refusal to
issue a policy.
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